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COPYRIGHT LAW: EXAMINING STANDARDS FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS OF
ARCHITECTURAL WORKS
T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97 (1st Cir. 2006)
Elina Valentine*

The Appellant T-Peg, Inc. is a corporation that sells architectural
designs and coordinating packages of materials for constructing
timberframed houses.' The Appellee, Vermont Timber Works, Inc., a
timberframe company with no architects on staff, provides shop drawings
based on consumer specifications and an in-house crew that assembles the
specific frames on site.2 The Appellant brought suit against the Appellee
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, alleging
copyright infringement of the preliminary architectural plans under the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA).3 The district
court granted summary judgment to the Appellee on the issues of copying
and substantial similarity4 between the Appellee's construction of the
timberframe based on its shop drawing and the architectural work
embodied in the Appellant's preliminary plans.5 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals, in reversing the district court's ruling, ruled that genuine issues
of material facts as to copying6 and substantial similarity between the

* J.D. Candidate, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2008. The author thanks her
husband, parents, and son, Jacob, for their unwavering love and support.
1. T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 105. Appellee does not provide building designs or architectural plans. Id.
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (1990). See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 107. Appellant registered the
architectural plans as architectural work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8). "A timberframe is a house
frame using wooden posts and beams which remain visible inside the building. The more common
'stick built' home, by contrast, is framed using two-inch lumber rather than posts and beams." Id.
at 102.
4. T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 107. To establish whether copyright infringement occurred, the
plaintiff must present evidence that establishes "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying
of constituent elements of the work that are original." Id. at 108 (citations omitted).
5. Supra text accompanying note 4.
6. To determine copying by indirect means, the plaintiffmust "provide evidence that (1) the
defendant 'enjoyed access to the copyrighted work,' and so had the opportunity to copy the work,
and (2) 'a sufficient degree of similarity exists between the copyrighted work and the allegedly
infringing work to give rise to an inference of actual copying."' T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 111 (citations
omitted).
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Appellee's shop drawing and timberframe and the Appellant's
architectural works existed under the "ordinary observer" standard.7
As a member of the Bere Convention," the U.S. Congress extended
copyright protection to architectural works.9 The statute further states that
the overall design, along with the elements within each plan, are protected
under the Act.'
The Second Circuit considered the standard for analyzing substantial
similarity issues in copyright infringement cases in Sturdza v. UnitedArab
Emirates.l"The plaintiff's architectural plans were initially chosen by the
defendant, UAE for the construction of its embassy. 2 The defendant, after
breaking off negotiations with the plaintiff, began construction of the
embassy using architectural plans that allegedly appropriated
characteristics that were the "hallmark" of the plaintiff's design. 3
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the
defendant's claim for summary judgment on the issue of copyright
infringement 4 after determining that the plaintiffs and the defendant's
architectural claims were not substantially similar. 5

7. See id.
at 116. Under the "ordinary observer" test, two works are substantially similar if
a "reasonable, ordinary observer, upon examination of the two works, would 'conclude that the
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectable expression."' Id. (citations omitted).
8. "[T]he Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works... require[s]
protection for 'three dimensional works relative to... architecture."' Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp.
2d 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citations omitted).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
An "architectural work" is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible
medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The
work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of
spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard
features.
Id.
10. Id.
11. 281 F.3d 1287 (2d Cir. 2002).
12. Id.at 1292.
13. Id.The UAE used another architect's design plans. These design plans were different
from the architect's original submission to the UAE and apparently incorporated many elements
on the plaintiff's design. Id.
14. The U.S. District Court also granted summary judgment on issues of breach of contract
and quantum meruit claims and dismissed the plaintiff's claims of "conspiracy to commit fraud,
tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and section 1985
claims." Id.
15. See id. at 1297. The district court "filtered out" unprotectable expressions of concepts
such as "domes, wind-towers, parapets, arches, and decorative patterns" and concluded that the
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reevaluated the district court's standard
for determining substantial similarity and reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment on the infringement claim. 6 According to the
district court, the overall look of the designs must be included in the
analysis of similarity.' 7 The Second Circuit noted that, while the district
court made a detailed analysis of individual expressions of concepts in the
design plans, there was no analysis of the "overall look and feel" of the
design.' 8
Upon establishing that the analysis of substantial similarity must
include a comparison of the total compilation of expressions, as well as the
individual expressions themselves, the Second Circuit ruled that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to the substantial similarity of the two
design plans.' Thus, the Second Circuit adopted a standard that includes
the overall look and feel of an architectural work in the analysis of
substantial similarity.2"
The Second Circuit decision in Sturdza' was further developed and
applied in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
decision, Shine v. Childs.22 In that decision, the district court declined to
use a test set out in an earlier Second Circuit holding that failed to consider
the overall composition of an architectural work 23 before determining the
lack of substantial similarity. 4
In Shine, the district court considered the defendant's claim for
summary judgment on the issue of probative similarity between the
architectural plans of the plaintiff's Olympic Tower and the defendant's
Freedom Tower.2 ' The plaintiff presented design plans he created for the

similarity between the remaining elements of the design was not substantial. Id. (citations omitted).
16. Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1299.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 1299. The district court noted that the two design plans at issue were "decidedly
different" as to their individual expression of elements, and failed to consider the overall
composition of the elements completely. Id. at 1297.
19. Id. at 1299.
20. Id.
21. See Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1299.
22. 382 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
23. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
24. See Shine, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
25. See id. The plaintiff' s complaint also included plans for a tower labeled Shine '99. Id. at
605. The court, using the plaintiff's expert testimony, ruled that no issue of material fact existed
as to substantial similarity between Shine '99 and the Freedom Tower and granted summary
judgment to the defendant on that particular claim. Id. at 612.
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Olympic Tower to a panel of experts that included the defendant.26 Several
years later, the defendant designed the Freedom Tower, 27 which, according
to the plaintiff, allegedly had an identical structural grid and a substantially
similar fagade to the Olympic Tower.28
The district court declined to apply the Altai test 29 proposed by the
defendant,3" choosing instead to follow the Second Circuit's "total concept
and feel" standard3 ' to determine probative similarity between the Olympic
Tower and the Freedom Tower.3 2 According to the district court, this
standard for determining similarity requires a comparison of the overall
structure of the architectural work (along with a comparison of separated,
original "kernels")-to ignore the overall composition of basic elements
would render any architectural work unoriginal. 33 Applying the "total
concept and feel" test, the district court determined that, although separate
elements of the Olympic tower were not original, the design similarities
of the Olympic Tower and the Freedom Tower were such that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether these similarities were
substantial enough to constitute copyright infringement.34 Thus, the district

26. Id. at 605. The plaintiff described the structure as "'a twisting tower with a symmetrical
diagonal column grid, expressed on the exterior of the building, that follows the twisting surface
created by the floor plates' geometry."' Id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff continued, stating the
grid he designed includes "'an elongated diamond pattern, supporting a textured curtain wall with
diamonds interlocking and protruding to create a crenelated appearance."' Id. (citation omitted).
27. The plaintiff described the Freedom Tower as "'taper[ing] as it rises and [having] two
straight, parallel, roughly triangular facades on opposite sides, with two twisting facades joining
them." Shine, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (citations omitted).
28. Id.
29. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (adopting a new
test for substantial similarity that involved separating works into structural parts and determining
"whether the protectable elements of the programs at issue are substantially similar so as to warrant
a finding of infringement.").
30. See Shine, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (stating that application oftheAltai test "'would result
in almost nothing being copyrightable because original works broken down into their composite
parts would usually be little more than basic unprotectable elements like letters, colors, and
symbols."') (citations omitted).
31. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001).
32. Shine, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 613-14.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 615. The Shine court outlined the similarities in the designs:
(1) each tower has a form that tapers and twists as it rises, (2) each tower has an
undulating, textured diamond shaped pattern covering its facade, and (3) the
facade's diamond pattern continues to and concludes at the foot of each tower,
where one or more half diamond shapes open up and allow for entry.
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court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to
substantial similarity between the Freedom Tower and the Olympic
Tower. 3
In the instant case,36 the First Circuit examined claims of copyright
infringement of an architectural work under the AWCPA as an issue of
first impression.37 The court disagreed with the district court and followed
the Second Circuit's trend of examining the overall structure, in addition
to original expressions of particular elements, in order to establish
similarity.3 In reviewing the district court's decision on whether the
defendant infringed on the plaintiff's copyright for the timberframe,39 the
circuit court began the analysis by outlining the factors required in the
instant case to determine copyright infringement.4" After determining that
the defendant accessed the copyrighted plans through a third party,4' the
circuit court focused on the substantial similarity between the plaintiff s
architectural designs and the defendant's constructed frame and shop
drawings.42
In the instant case, the First Circuit analyzed the substantial similarity
factor under the "ordinary observer" standard,43 but in doing so, noted that
the overall design and "arrangement and composition of spaces and
elements" should be compared along with the individual elements of each
work." The circuit court found that the district court erred in its analysis
of substantial similarity by failing to consider the composition of particular
elements.45 Specifically, the circuit court disagreed with the Appellee's
contention that the plans were not substantially similar because the
Appellee's external structure could house a number of internal

Shine, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
35. Id.
36. T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 2006).
37. Id. at 101.
38. See id. at 115-16.
39. In the analysis, the T-Peg court compared the plaintiffs timberframe architectural designs
and the defendant's constructed frame and shop drawings. Id. at 112.
40. See id. at 111 ((1) access; (2) substantial similarity).
41. A third party filed that plans publicly with the Town of Salisbury, and, in doing so,
revealed the plans to the defendant. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 111.
42. See id. at 112. Although the analysis of factors requires a determination of both probative
similarity and substantial similarity, the instant court noted that the analysis merged somewhat and
that the jury could find probative similarity "for the same reasons a jury could find there is
substantial similarity." Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 114.
45. Id. at 115. The similarities included the arrangement of posts, staircase placement,
general measurements, and a particular timberframe backward L-shaped footprint. Id.
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configurations.46 Further, the circuit court emphasized that the district
court failed to compare Timberpeg's overall composition and combination
of individual elements in the opinion.47 Thus, while the instant court
introduced the "ordinary observer" standard in copyright infringement
actions under the AWCPA,48 it used factors not outlined in the standard to
determine whether the issue of substantial similarity was material enough
to be presented to the jury.49
Congress adopted the AWCPA 0 in 1990 to fulfill a membership
requirement of the Beme Convention. 1 The Act protects architectural
works embodied in any "tangible medium for expression,"52 including
preliminary architectural designs like the Timberpeg design in the instant
case. 3 The First Circuit applied the "ordinary observer" standard in
previous copyright infringement cases. 4 However, when considering
copyright infringement in the instant case, the First Circuit chose to follow
the Second Circuit in its recent district court and appellate court
decisions. 5
Like the Sturdza court, the instant court compared preliminary
architectural plans with buildings already constructed56 and in doing so,
reversed the district court's finding that no genuine issue of material fact
as to copyright infringement existed. 7 In both cases, the district court
appeared confused on the issue of substantial similarity in regard to an

46. T-Peg, 459 F.3dat 115.
47. Id. The First Circuit outlined the similarities between the defendant's frame and the
plaintiff's architectural plans: a lofted second wall in the same location and ofthe same dimensions,
a roof pitch of the same dimensions, the height of the plate (wall), and wall locations with regard
to an additional wing (the defendant did not include walls in the shop drawings where the plaintiff
had designed an extra wing. In addition, the defendant's structure contained a stick-built addition
in the same place). Id. at 113.
48. The First Circuit previously applied the "originary observer" standard to non-architectural
works. See Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2005).
49. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 116.
50. 17. U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
51. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 109.
52. Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 112.
54. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2005).
55. See Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1287.
56. See Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1297-98. Because in Sturdza, the second architect's original
plans were for a different design, the constructed embassy and the original architectural plans had
to be compared to determine similarities. Id. In T-Peg, the defendant was not in the business of
designing architectural plans, so the only materials available for comparison were shop drawings
and the actual timberframe constructed by the defendants. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 107.
57. T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 102.
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architectural work and, thus, misapplied the AWCPA.5 s The Sturdza court
and the T-Peg court emphasized the district court's failure to consider the
overall form in the analysis of substantial similarity of the respective
artistic work.59 Although in deciding the instant case, the court did not
mention holdings of other circuits regarding the standard used to analyze
architectural works, the "ordinary observer test" usually utilized by the
First Circuit in copyright infringement cases was altered to fit the standard
set by the AWCPA.6° The language of AWCPA 6 encourages the broader
standard officially adopted by the Second Circuit62 and followed loosely
by the T-Peg court.63 In analyzing the substantial similarity issue as a
matter of first impression, the instant court correctly determined that most
architectural works would not fit the narrow standard the district court
used in the analysis.' In the instant case, and in the Sturdza decision,
separating the architectural works into separate expressions of elements
and overlooking the overall form would have denied plaintiffs the jury trial
and allowed the adoption of the district court's narrow interpretation of the
AWCPA.65
The Shine66 district court recently considered the standard to determine
substantial similarity of architectural works and also took into account the
overall form of the work and individual copyrightable expressions. 67 As in
the instant case, the architectural design in the Shine case 68 had numerous

58. In T-Peg, the circuit court originally failed to consider the AWCPA completely and
granted summary judgment without considering that the preliminary architectural plans could be
compared with the shop drawings and actual constructions of the timberframe. The court chose to
focus on specific protectable elements instead of including the overall form into the substantial
similarity analysis. Id. at I11.
59. See Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1297; T-Peg, 450 F.3d at 113-14.
60. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 112, 114.
61. The applicable part of the AWCPA states that the definition of an architectural work
"includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in
the design." 17. U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
62. The Sturdza decision was followed by the district court in Shine v. Childs. See Shine v.
Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
63. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 116.
64. Id. at 113.
65. See Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1291; T-Peg, 459 3d at 116. In both Sturdza and T-Peg, the
district court granted the defendants motions for summary judgment, ruling that the works were not
substantially similar when their separated expressions of ideas were compared. Sturdza, 285 F.3d
at 1291; T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 116.
66. Shine, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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71
overall similarities, 69 but differed in the specific details.70 The Shine
court's72 interpretation of AWCPA was similar to the analysis of the instant
court.

Thus, in the instant case, the First Circuit established an expansive
standard of comparing architectural works to determine copyright
infringement. According to the instant court, overall compilation of
elements in an architectural work should be considered when the district
court determines whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
copyright infringement. 73 This holding followed the earlier decisions of the
Second Circuit in broadly interpreting the AWCPA and allowing
architectural works greater protection than protection for mere elements.

69. The similarities included the twist and the concept of the towers. Id.
70. As the Shine court explains,
It is true that, as defendants' expert points out, twisting towers have been built
before. Towers with diamond-windowed facades have been built before. Towers
with support grids similar to the one in Olympic Tower have been built before.
Towers with setbacks have been built before. But defendants do not present any
evidence that the particular combinations of design elements in either Shine '99
or Olympic Tower are unoriginal.
Id. at 610-11.
71. See Shine, 382 F. Supp. at 610-11.
72. See T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. TimberWorks, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 116 (1st Cir. 2006).
73. Id.

